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Abstract: Life in modern society becomes easier due to rapid growth of different technologies like real-time analytic, ubiquitous
wireless communication, commodity sensors, machine learning, and embedded systems. Nowadays, there seems to be a need to
merge these technologies in the form of Internet of Things (IoT) so that smart systems can be achieved. On the other hand, cloud
computing is a pillar in IoT by which end users get connected through the cloud servers for getting different services. However,
to recognize the legitimacy of communicators during communication sessions through insecure channels like the Internet, serious
issues in cloud based IoT applications need to be addressed. Thus authentication procedure is highly desirable to remove the
unapproved access in IoT applications. This paper presents an ElGamal cryptosystem and biometric information along with a
user’s password-based authentication scheme for cloud based IoT applications refereed as SAS-Cloud. Security of the proposed
scheme has been analyzed by well popular random oracle model and it is found that SAS-Cloud has ability to defend all the pos-
sible attacks. Furthermore, performance of SAS-Cloud has been evaluated and it was found that SAS-Cloud has better efciency
than other existing competing ElGamal cryptosystem-based authentication schemes.
1 Introduction
In modern society, connection with everyone and everything through
Internet enabled electronic devices has become common for smart
living [1]. To facilitate this, network research community has been
trying to develop such systems so that efcient and reliable commu-
nication can be done from remote places. This networking system
is known as Internet of Things" (IoT). IoT can be stated as: it is
a system, in which interrelated computing devices, mechanical and
digital machines, objects, animals or people that are provided with
distinctive identiers and the ability to transfer data over a network∗.
There are many application areas for IoT implementation, such as
Health Care, Transportation, Industry, Market, Education, Vehicles,
Smart Home and Agriculture, among others. The IoT applications
are developed on the top of cloud systems [2], where the cloud sys-
tem acts as the enabler for the IoT applications as shown in Fig. 1.
The cloud has three main features like SaaS (Software as a Ser-
vice), SaaS (Storage as a service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and
IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) [2]. Therefore, end users get dif-
ferent services such as medical, educational, industrial and so on, by
accessing the cloud server, which is known as the service provider.
In IoT applications, Internet enabled things like vehicles and sensors
collect data from the area or environment and supply the data to the
cloud server. The cloud server processes the data and provides a cor-
responding feedback. In order to get the data from remote places by
accessing the server, the end users have to get permission from the
server rst and then agree upon a shared secret key for further secure
communication within the current session which is known as remote
user authentication (see Fig. 1). After getting the data, end users can
∗http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/Internet-of-
Things-IoT
also provide a feedback to the Internet enabled e-devices. A huge
amount of data transaction takes place in any IoT system. For each
case of data transaction, the system needs to check whether the user
is authentic or not by the proper efcient and secure authentication
protocol. This work concentrates on developing a secure remote user
verication scheme in cloud environment of IoT applications.
• Motivation
There are several challenges in case of user authentication tech-
niques. History says that no security could prove absolute secure
over long period due to the smart and updated attacker. However,
this study nds that most of the existing authentication schemes (can
be applied in cloud based applications) do not protect systems from
all security attacks. Furthermore, the existing protocols have lack
of efciency in terms of: (a) computational cost, (b) communication
cost, (c) inability to detect wrong inputs during login as well as pass-
word phases, (d) extra communication overhead to alter the users’
password, and (e) disclosure of the users’ identity to the attacker.
A proper efcient and secure authentication scheme for cloud based
IoT applications should overcome or alleviate all the aforementioned
issues and provide user friendly facilities.
• Contribution
This paper proposes a secure scheme using biometric information
of users and ElGamal cryptosystem. We refer to this here as SAS-
Cloud (Secure Authentication Scheme in Cloud based IoT Systems),
to build a concrete authentication system for cloud applications. The
security of SAS-Cloud is examined using well popular random oracle
model, and the efciency of SAS-Cloud is evaluated and compared
with other reported competing schemes.
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Fig. 1: A general view of Cloud based IoT architecture: authentication and secure message transmission from end users’ viewpoint
The study is structured as follows. A quick overview of existing
authentication protocols is highlighted in the next section. Section 3
describes some mathematical denitions, which are used in the pro-
posed scheme. Section 4 demonstrates the adversary model as well
as network model to introduce the proposed scheme. Our ElGamal-
based three factor authentication scheme for cloud based IoT appli-
cation, SAS-Cloud, is described in section 5. Security analysis of the
proposed SAS-Cloud scheme and performance comparison of SAS-
Cloud with related competing schemes are provided in section 6 and
section 7, respectively. Advantages to used the proposed SAS-Cloud
is given in section 8. The concluding remarks of this paper are stated
in section 9.
2 Related Work
Lamport [3] rst introduced a password-based authentication
scheme using one way hash function. Thereafter many user authenti-
cation schemes [410] have been presented in this regard, which are
based on only password for various Internet based applications. Jain
et al. in [11] mentioned that biometric information based technology
produces an effective verication tool in wireless communication.
Furthermore, in many commercial, civilian, and forensic applica-
tions, biometric systems have been installed to verify identity of
users [11]. Therefore, the researchers have appraised biometric with
the password to amplify the degree of security [12]. Research com-
munity of this study have suggested various password and biometric
based authentication schemes in [1220]. Tan [13] presented a three-
factor authentication scheme in 2013. According to Yan et al. [14],
the scheme [13] is insecure from the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
and suggested their own scheme. However, Mishra et al. [15] showed
that the scheme in [14] can not protect the off-line password guess-
ing attack and it has incompetent login, and password change phases.
Chuang and Chen [16] also proposed a biometric based authenti-
cation scheme, which can be applied in cloud environment. Maitra
and Giri [17] stated that an adversary can create forge message on
Chuang and Chen’s scheme [16], and introduced a counter mea-
sure scheme in [17]. Very recently, Wazid et al. [19] also introduced
a biometric-based authentication scheme in cloud environment and
after evaluating their proposed scheme through formal security anal-
ysis, the authors claimed that the proposed scheme is secure from
security threats. However, the discussed authentication protocols are
based on only hash function, thus the security of those schemes are
dependant on hardness of one-way hash function.
On the other hand, authentication using public key cryptography
like RSA based [21, 22], ElGamal based [23], Robin cryptosystem
based [24], ECC-based [2527], Bilinear Pairing based [28, 29] and
so on is also well popular in the literature. However, this paper aims
to design an authentication scheme for cloud based IoT applica-
tion using ElGamal cryptosystem [30]. Hence we discuss only the
authentication protocols using ElGamal cryptosystem reported in
[23, 3138]. Hwang and Li [23] proposed an ElGamal based authen-
tication protocol without using any password verication table in
order to eliminate password stolen attack at the server end. The
authors claimed that the proposed protocol can resist different known
attacks. Chan and Cheng [31] identied that different kinds of secu-
rity attacks like password guessing attack, impersonation attacks,
man-in the-middle attack and DoS attack can be mounted in the pro-
tocol [23]. Shen et al. [32] also proved that the protocol provided
in [23] is defenceless against masquerading attack, therefore Shen
et al. demonstrated a solution to prevent the masquerading attack on
Hwang and Li’s scheme by proposing an enhanced scheme in [32].
However, the modied protocol [32], proposed by Shen et al. is not
totally secured as pointed out by Leung et al. in [33]. Yoon et al.
[34] proposed a new smart card based client server authentication
protocol using ElGamal signature and claimed that their protocol
can resist forgery attack. However, Tian et al. in [35] argued that
the protocol in [34] cannot make absolute protection against forgery
attack and proposed a modied protocol in [35]. Ramasamy and
Muniyandi [36] introduced a smart card based authentication pro-
tocol using ElGamal cryptosystem claiming that their protocol can
withstand all the possible security threats like parallel session attack,
forgery attack and denial of service attack. However Lee et al. [37]
gured out that the Ramasamy and Muniyandi’s scheme [36] cannot
prevent all kind of attacks and they have proposed a new smart card
based authentication protocol in [37] to overcome the shortcoming.
Very recently, Maitra et al. [38] showed that an adversary can mount
forgery attack as well as password guessing attack on Lee et al.’s
scheme [37] after stealing the smart card of a legal user.
3 Preliminaries
Denition 1. A cryptographic hash function [17, 20] can be rep-
resented as: H : S1 → S2, where S1, a binary string of random
length is taken as an input to produce a binary string S2 of
xed length l. The cryptographic hash function H(·) is said to be
collision-resistant, if the following condition is maintained:
AdvHA (t1) = Pr
[
(a1, a2) ∈R S1 × S1 | (a1 6= a2)
∧ H(a1) = H(a2)
]
,
(1)
where Pr[E ] represents the random event E produced by an adver-
sary A for the time span t1 and AdvHA (t1) ≤ η1, for any small
η1 > 0 is the probability of advantage to nd two different binary
strings a1 and a2 over time span t1.
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Denition 2. A fuzzy extractor (FE) [12] has two procedures: one is
Gen, which can be represented as Gen : MS → φ× θ, where MS
is a binary string i.e., biometric information B (a binary string after
extracting feature of biometric by some well known mechanism like
singular point extraction for ngerprint [39]), φ is a random string
and θ is an auxiliary string, and another procedure is Rep, which
can be represented as Rep : MS × θ → φ. The fuzzy extractor FE
is called collision-resistant if following condition is maintained:
AdvEFA (t2) =Pr
[
(B,B′) ∈R MS ×MS | (B 6= B′) ∧
des(B,B′) ≤ δd ∧ Gen(B) = Gen(B′)
∧ Rep(B, θ) = Rep(B′, θ′)
]
,
(2)
where Pr[E ] represents the random event E produced by an adver-
sary A for the time span t2 and AdvFEA (t2) ≤ η2, for any small
η2 > 0 is the probability of advantage to nd two different biomet-
ric strings B and B′. Note that des(·) is a distance measurement
function like Hamming distance between two different binary strings
and δd is a distance tolerance value. However, both des(·) and δd
are pre-dened in fuzzy extractor system and same for all users’
biometric.
Denition 3. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [38] states that it
is hard to obtain a ∈ Z∗p from known inputs A, p and g such that
A = ga mod p for any prime number p. DLP can be called a hard
problem if the following condition is maintained:
AdvDA(t3) = Pr
[
a ∈ Z∗p | A = ga mod p
]
, (3)
where Pr[E ] represents the random event E produced by an adver-
sary A for the time span t3 and AdvDA(t3) ≤ η3, for any small
η3 > 0 is the probability of advantage to nd a from given A.
4 Models
This section will discuss network and adversary models to introduce
the proposed SAS-Cloud.
4.1 Network Model
According to the architecture of the proposed scheme, through
enrollment procedure, users have to register to a service provider
SP to get their registration conformation (See Fig. 2(a)). For this
purpose, users send a request for registration to SP in off-line or
personally. After getting the request, SP provides some registration
information to the users so that the users can use this information in
login time.
Whenever a registered user wants to get service from SP by
accessing the mobile application via insecure channel, the user trans-
mits a login message to SP . Upon checking the login message, SP
gives reply to the user. After getting the reply, the user veries the
reply message (See Fig. 2(b)). For the correct reply, both the user
and SP agree on a secret and common session key [40].
4.2 Threat Model
This study has considered the threat model proposed by Dolev-
Yao [41] to evaluate the security of the SAS-Cloud. According to
this model [41], the communicating parties convey their message
through an insecure channel during login as well as authentica-
tion phases. Therefore, an attacker A can capture the transmitted
messages, and furthermore A can alter or delete the contents of
the messages as shown in Fig. 2(b). The attacker A also acquires
the information, which is stored in the user’s electronic device like
mobile phone, tablet or laptop by monitoring the consumption of
power [42]. According to the threat model, this paper considers the
following two attackers:
• Attacks by Outsider. A third party A (as an attacker), who is
unrelated to this system may try to hamper in the authentication
procedure by mounting various attacks. .
• Attacks by Insider. A valid user Â (as an attacker), who is a part of
the system may try to obtain condential information of the server
so that Â can inject several attacks on the authentication system.
5 SAS-Cloud: The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present a secure authentication scheme for IoT
application using fuzzy extractor and ElGamal Cryptosystem, called
as SAS-Cloud. Symbols and their uses are given in Table 1. SAS-
Cloud has ve phases namely, (a) set-up phase, (b) enrollment phase,
(c) login phase, (d) authentication with key agreement phase and (e)
password update phase.
5.1 Set-up Phase
A service provider SP executes algorithm K to get a large prime
number q. SP picks a cyclic multiplicative group G of order q
with a generator g. Then it picks a number s randomly such that
s ∈R Z∗q and computes PK = gs mod q. Furthermore, it selects
a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k , where k is
an integer number with xed length. Ultimately, SP declares pub-
lic information Param = 〈G, PK, g, q,H(·)〉 and keeps s as secret
key.
5.2 Enrollment Phase
Whenever a new user Ui likes to enroll in the service provider SP ,
registration phase is invoked using the steps shown below:
1. The user Ui opens the application from his/her electronic gad-
get and inputs his/her biometric feature (i.e., ngerprint) to a sensor
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Table 1 Nomenclature used in the paper
Term Usage
G A multiplicative group of prime order q
g Generator of group G
H(·) Cryptographic hash function
Ui i-th User
SP Service provider
s Secret key of SP
PK Public key of SP
PWi Password of Ui
IDi Identity of Ui
Bi Biometric information of Ui
ri Random number picked up by mobile
yi Random number picked up by SP
des(·) Distance evaluation function
δd Estimated difference
Y ′ Parameter Y calculated or obtained by mobile
Y ∗ Parameter Y obtained or calculated by SP
SKi Common and secret session key between Ui and SP
⊕ Exclusive-OR operation
‖ Concatenation/append operation
enabled device like mobile. The device creates a corresponding bio-
metric information Bi (dened in Denition 2 of Section 3) and
provides it to Ui.
2. Ui chooses an identity IDi, password PWi and generates an
unique pair (θi, φi) from Bi by computing (φi, θi)← Gen(Bi). Ui
then computes PWRi =H(PWi‖φi) and sends 〈IDi,PWRi〉 to
SP through a private channel.
3. After getting a registration request 〈IDi,PWRi〉 from Ui, SP
computes Ai = H(s‖IDi) and Di = H(Ai). SP then checks that
Di exists in its list or not. If it is exist, SP gives a negative acknowl-
edgement (i.e., decline message) to Ui because, received IDi is not
unique and it may be used by another user. In such case, Ui has
to selects another identity until unique identity is not acquired. If
Di does not exist in its list, SP calculates Ci = Ai ⊕ PWRi and
sends a registration information 〈Ci, Di, des(·), δd〉 to Ui through
a private channel, where des(·) is a distance measurement func-
tion (dened in Denition 2 of Section 3). SP then updates its list
U_List by incorporating Di into it.
4. After receiving the registration information 〈Ci, Di, des(·), δd〉,
Ui computes B̂i = Bi ⊕H(IDi‖PWi), θ̂i = θi ⊕H(IDi‖PWi).
Finally, Ui stores 〈Ci, Di, B̂i, θ̂i, des(·), δd〉 into the memory of
his/her electronic gadget like mobile phone. Note that, this study
assumes that extracted feature from biometric i.e., binary string Bi
and result of hash value are same bits long, which are n bits.
Fig. 3 shows the pictorial view of enrollment phase.
5.3 Login Phase
If a registered user Ui likes to get entry into the system by access-
ing the service provider SP , login phase is invoked. Ui opens the
application from mobile and provides his/her biometric information
B∗i via sensor, identity IDi and password PWi to the mobile. The
mobile then computes the following procedures:
1. The mobile executes B′i = B̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi) and veries
des(B∗i ,B′i) ≤ δd. If it does not satisfying the condition, Ui will
be rejected; otherwise, it computes the next step.
2. The mobile calculates θ′i = θ̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi), φ′i ←
Rep(B∗i , θ′i), PWR′i = H(PWi‖φ′i), A′i = Ci ⊕ PWR′i, D′i =H(A′i) and checks D′i =? Di. If equality does not preserve, the
mobile refuses Ui; otherwise, it computes the next step.
3. The mobile selects a number ri ∈R Z∗q randomly and computes
Ei = PK
ri mod q, Gi = gri mod q, DIDi = (IDi‖ri) · Ei mod q
and Fi = H(ri‖Ei‖A′i). Ui then transmits a login request message〈DIDi, Gi, Fi〉 to SP through Internet (a public channel). Note that
Ui operates his/her mobile thus, mobile of Ui sends the login mes-
sage on behalf of Ui. However, in this study, we use mobile device
of Ui and Ui, alternatively.
5.4 Authentication with Key Agreement Phase
Upon getting the login request message 〈DIDi, Gi, Fi〉 from Ui,
SP computes the following steps:
1. SP computes E∗i = Gis mod q, extracts (IDi‖ri) as (ID∗i ‖r∗i )
= DIDi · (E∗i )−1 mod q and calculates A∗i = H(s‖ID∗i ) and
checks that D∗i (= H(A∗i )) exists into U_List or not. If it does not
nd it, SP rejects Ui; otherwise, it executes next step.
[Verication of (IDi‖ri) = DIDi · (E∗i )−1]:
DIDi · (E∗i )−1 mod q
≡ (IDi‖ri) · Ei · (E∗i )−1, Since DIDi = (IDi‖ri) · Ei
≡ (IDi‖ri) · PKri · (Gis)−1,
Since E∗i = Gis and Ei = PKri
≡ (IDi‖ri) · gs·ri · (gs·ri)−1,
Since PK = gs and Gi = gri
≡ (IDi‖ri)
2. SP calculates F ∗i = H(r∗i ‖E∗i ‖A∗i ) and further checks F ∗i =?
Fi. For the inequality, SP rejects the login message ofUi; otherwise,
it goes to the next step.
3. SP selects a number yi ∈R Z∗q random and further computes Qi
= A∗i ⊕ yi, SKi =H(yi‖r∗i ), Li =H(ID∗i ‖SKi‖A∗i ) and sends a
reply message 〈Qi, Li〉 to Ui via a insecure channel. SP accepts
SKi as a common and secret session key.
After getting the reply message 〈Qi, Li〉 from SP , the mobile of
Ui performs the following step to authenticate the reply message of
SP:
1. The mobile calculates y′i = A′i ⊕Qi, SK′i = H(y′i‖ri), L′i =H(IDi‖SK′i‖A′i) and checks L′i =? Li. If the equality is satised,Ui concurs upon the common secret key SK ′i (= SKi); otherwise, it
refuses the reply message.
Fig. 4 depicts a pictorial view of login and authentication with key
agreement phases.
5.5 Password Update Phase
If a user Ui likes to alter his/her password, this phase is invoked.
Ui opens the application from mobile and provides his/her biometric
information B∗i through sensor, identity IDi and password PWi to
the mobile. The mobile then executes the following steps:
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Ui SP
Extract biometric Bi from sensor
Choose IDi and PWi
Generate (φi, θi)← Gen(Bi)
Compute PWRi =H(PWi‖φi) Supply 〈IDi,PWRi〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Compute Ai =H(s‖IDi), Di =H(Ai)
Check Di is present in U_List
For availability, compute Ci = Ai ⊕ PWRi
Compute B̂i = Bi ⊕H(IDi‖PWi) Provide 〈Ci, Di, des(·), δd〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Add Di into U_List
θ̂i = θi ⊕H(IDi‖PWi)
Store 〈Ci, Di, des(·), B̂i, θ̂i, δd〉 into mobile
Fig. 3: Enrollment phase of SAS-Cloud
Ui Public channel SP
Submit B∗i , IDi and PWi
Compute B′i = B̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi)
Check des(B∗i ,B′i) ≤ δd
Compute θ′i = θ̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi)
φ′i← Rep(B∗i , θ′i), PWR′i =H(PWi‖φ′i)
A′i = Ci ⊕ PWR′i, D′i =H(A′i)
Verify D′i =? Di
Pick ri ∈R Z∗q
Compute Ei = PKri mod q
Gi = g
ri mod q, Fi =H(ri‖Ei‖A′i)
DIDi = (IDi‖ri) · Ei mod q 〈DIDi, Gi, Fi〉−−−−−−−−−−−→ Compute E
∗
i = Gi
s mod q
Extract (ID∗i ‖r∗i ) = DIDi · E∗i −1 mod q
Calculate A∗i =H(s‖ID∗i )
CheckH(A∗i ) is present in U_List
Compute F ∗i =H(r∗i ‖E∗i ‖A∗i )
Check F ∗i =? Fi
Choose yi ∈R Z∗q
Compute Qi = A∗i ⊕ yi, SKi =H(yi‖r∗i )
Li =H(ID∗i ‖SKi‖A∗i )
Compute y′i = A′i ⊕Qi 〈Qi, Li〉←−−−−−−−− SKi as common secret session key
SK′i =H(y′i‖ri), L′i =H(IDi‖SK′i‖A′i)
Check L′i =? Li
SK′i (= SKi) as shared secret session key
Fig. 4: Login and authentication with key agreement phases of SAS-Cloud
1. The mobile calculates B′i = B̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi) and veries
des(B∗i ,B′i) ≤ δd. For not satisfying the condition, Ui will be
rejected; otherwise, it computes the next step.
2. The mobile calculates θ′i = θ̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi), φ′i ←
Rep(B∗i , θ′i), PWR′i = H(PWi‖φ′i), A′i = Ci ⊕ PWR′i, D′i =H(A′i) and veries D′i =? Di. If equality does not hold, Ui will
be rejected; otherwise, the mobile device is allowed to enter a new
password.
3. Ui picks a new password PW [new]i and inputs it to the
mobile. The mobile then executes PWR[new]i =H(PW
[new]
i ‖φ′i),
C
[new]
i = A
′
i ⊕ PWR[new]i , B̂
[new]
i = B′i ⊕H(IDi‖PW
[new]
i )
and θ̂[new]i = θ
′
i ⊕H(IDi‖PW [new]i ). The mobile then replaces
Ci, B̂i and θ̂i with C[new]i , B̂
[new]
i and θ̂
[new]
i , respectively.
6 Security Analysis of SAS-Cloud
This study has done the formal security analysis of SAS-Cloud under
the random oracle model. We dene the random oracles for the
formal security analysis of SAS-Cloud as follows:
• A random oracle OracleH keeps a tuple 〈u, v〉 such that v =
H(u). It supplies u from v upon getting a query (qH, v) if 〈u, v〉 is
exist in the tuple; otherwise, produces a number r1 randomly. Then
it reserves 〈r1, v〉 into its tuple as a new entry.
• Random oracle OracleFE contains two parts:
1. From a tuple 〈B, φ, θ〉, OracleFEGen unconditionally gener-
ates the pair (φ, θ) after getting a query (qGen,B) such that (φ, θ)
← Gen(B) if 〈B, φ, θ〉 exists in its tuple; else, it supplies two num-
bers r2 and r3 randomly. Then it reserves a new entry 〈B, r2, r3〉
into its tuple.
2. From a tuple 〈B′, φ, θ〉, OracleFERep unconditionally gener-
ates φ after getting a query (qRep,B′, θ) such that φ← Rep(B′, θ)
if 〈B′, φ, θ〉 exists in its tuple; else, it supplies a number r4 randomly.
Then it reserves 〈B′, r4, θ〉 into its tuple as a new entry .
• Random oracle OracleD keeps a tuple 〈c1, c2, g, q〉 such that c2
= gc1 mod q. It produces c1 from c2 upon getting a query (qD, c2)
if 〈c1, c2〉 exists in its tuple; otherwise, supplies a number r5 ran-
domly. Then it reserves 〈r5, c2, g, q〉 into its tuple as a new entry
.
Theorem 1. Under the assumption that a fuzzy extractor FE and
cryptographic hash function H(·) represent the random oracles,
SAS-Cloud is provably secure against an attacker A for acquiring
the password PWi, biometric Bi and identity IDi of a user Ui even
if A obtains the parameters that are preserved into the mobile of
Ui and captures the communication messages between Ui and the
service provider SP .
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Algorithm 1 EXP1oracleA, SAS−Cloud
Input: Ci, Di, B̂i, θ̂i, DIDi, Gi, Fi, Li, PK, g, q
Output: 0 or 1; 0: Fail and 1: Win
1: Asks OracleH on the input Di to obtain the information Ai (=H(s‖IDi)) as (A∗i )←OracleH(Di)
2: Asks OracleH on the input Fi to get the information Ai, ri and Ei as (r∗i ‖E∗i ‖A∗∗i )←OracleH(Fi)
3: Asks OracleH on the input Li to get the information SKi, IDi and Ai as (ID∗i ‖SK∗i ‖A∗∗∗i )←OracleH(Li)
4: Computes E∗∗i = PK
r∗i mod q and G∗i = g
r∗i mod q
5: if (A∗∗∗i == A
∗∗
i == A
∗
i ) && (E
∗
i == E
∗∗
i ) && (Gi == G
∗
i ) then
6: Computes (ID∗∗i ‖r∗∗i ) = DIDi · (E∗i )−1 mod q
7: Asks OracleH on the input A∗i to get the information s and IDi)) as (s∗‖ID∗∗∗i )←OracleH(A∗i )
8: if (r∗∗i == r
∗
i ) && (ID∗∗i == ID∗i == ID∗∗∗i ) then
9: Computes PWR∗i = Ci ⊕A∗i
10: repeat
11: Chooses a password PW [guess]i
12: Computes B∗i = B̂i ⊕H(ID∗i ‖PW [guess]i ) and θ∗i = θ̂i ⊕H(ID∗i ‖PW
[guess]
i )
13: Asks OracleFERep on the input B∗i and θ∗i to get the information φi, as (φ∗i )←OracleFERep(B∗i , θ∗i )
14: Calculates PWR[guess]i =H(PW
[guess]
i ‖φ∗i )
15: until (PWR[guess]i == PWR∗i )
16: if (PWR[guess]i == PWR∗i ) then
17: Accepts PW [guess]i , ID∗i and B∗i as correct password, identity and biometric
18: Return 1
19: else
20: Return 0
21: end if
22: else
23: Return 0
24: end if
25: else
26: Return 0
27: end if
Proof: This study constructs an attacker A who has the ability
to obtain the password PW i, identity IDi and biometric infor-
mation Bi of Ui. In this regards, this work assumes that the
mobile device of a user Ui is lost or stolen. Therefore, A can
obtain the stored information 〈Ci, Di, B̂i, θ̂i〉 from the memory of
mobile of Ui by calculating power consumption [42]. The attacker
A also captures the login request message 〈DIDi, Gi, Fi〉 and
a reply message 〈Qi, Li〉. The adversary A executes the experi-
ment, EXP1oracleA, SAS−Cloud for our secure authentication scheme(SAS-Cloud) to get the password PW i, identity IDi and biometric
parameter Bi of the user Ui as discussed in Algorithm 1.
This study denes the success probability for EXP1oracleA, SAS−Cloud
as Succ1oracleA, SAS−Cloud = |2Pr[EXP1oracleA, SAS−Cloud = 1]−
1|. Then the advantage of EXP1oracleA, SAS−Cloud is given by
Adv1oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH, qFE) = maxA{Succ1oracleA, SAS−Cloud},
where the maximum is considered over all A with the implementa-
tion time t, qH and qFE are the # of queries submitted toOracleH
and OracleFE oracles, respectively. It can be said that SAS-Cloud
is provably secure against the attacker A for obtaining the pass-
word PWi, identity IDi and biometric information Bi of Ui, if
Adv1oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH, qFE) ≤ η, for any negligible η > 0.
EXP1oracleA, SAS−Cloud (see Algorithm 1) shows that, ifA earns suc-
cess to execute the reverse of cryptographic hash function H(·) and
can explore the hardness of fuzzy extractor, then A will correctly
obtain the password PWi, identity IDi and biometric parameter
Bi of Ui by employing random oracles OracleH and OracleFE ,
respectively, and secures the win in this game. However, according
to Denitions 1 and 2, we can write that AdvOracleHA (t) ≤ η1, for
any negligible η1 > 0 and AdvOracleFEA (t) ≤ η2, for any negli-
gible η2 > 0. Therefore, we get Adv1oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH, qFE)≤ η, for any negligible η > 0 as the SAS-Cloud depends on both
AdvOracleHA (t) and Adv
OracleFE
A (t). Therefore, SAS-Cloud pro-
vides the security against the attacker A for obtaining the password
PWi, identity IDi and biometric information Bi of Ui. 
Theorem 2. Under the assumption that DLP and cryptographic
hash function H(·) represent the random oracles, SAS-Cloud is
provably secure against an attacker A for getting the private key
s of service provider SP even if A knows the parameters that are
reserved into Ui’s mobile and captures the communication messages
between Ui and SP .
Proof: This work constructs an attacker A who has the ability to
get the private key s of the service provider SP . However, we con-
sider the same suppositions discussed in Theorem 1. The attacker
A executes the experiment, EXP2oracleA, SAS−Cloud for the secure
authentication scheme (SAS-Cloud) to get the private key s of the
service provider SP as provided in Algorithm 2.
We dene the success probability for EXP2oracleA, SAS−Cloud
as Succ2oracleA, SAS−Cloud = |2Pr[EXP2oracleA, SAS−Cloud = 1]−
1|. Then the advantage of EXP2oracleA, SAS−Cloud is given by
Adv2oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH, qD) = maxA{Succ2oracleA, SAS−Cloud},
where we have considered the maximum over all A with the imple-
mentation time t, # of queries qH, qD submitted to OracleH and
OracleD oracles, respectively. The proposed SAS-Cloud is prov-
ably secure against the attacker A for obtaining the secret key s of
the service provider SP , if Adv2oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH) ≤ η1, for
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Algorithm 2 EXP2oracleA, SAS−Cloud
Input: Di, DIDi, Gi, Fi, Li, PK, g, q,Qi
Output: 0 or 1; 0: Fail, 1: Win
1: Asks OracleH on the input Di to obtain the information Ai (=H(s‖IDi)) as (A∗i )←OracleH(Di)
2: Asks OracleH on the input Fi to get the information Ai, ri and Ei as (r∗i ‖E∗i ‖A∗∗i )←OracleH(Fi)
3: Asks OracleD on the input PK (= gs mod q) to obtain the information s as (s∗)←OracleD(PK)
4: Asks OracleH on the input Li to get the information SKi, IDi and Ai as (ID∗i ‖SK∗i ‖A∗∗∗i )←OracleH(Li)
5: Asks OracleD on the input Gi (= gri mod q) and g to get the information ri as (r∗∗i )←OracleD(Gi, g)
6: if (r∗i == r
∗∗
i ) && (A
∗∗∗
i == A
∗∗
i == A
∗
i ) then
7: Computes E∗∗i = PK
r∗i mod q
8: if (E∗i == E
∗∗
i ) then
9: Computes (ID∗∗i ‖r∗∗∗i ) = DIDi · (E∗i )−1 mod q
10: Asks OracleH on the input A∗i to get the information s and IDi)) as (s∗∗‖ID∗∗∗i )←OracleH(A∗i )
11: if (r∗∗∗i == r
∗
i ) && (ID∗∗i == ID∗i == ID∗∗∗i ) && (s∗ == s∗∗) then
12: Accepts s∗ as private key of SP
13: Return 1
14: else
15: Return 0
16: end if
17: else
18: Return 0
19: end if
20: else
21: Return 0
22: end if
any negligible η1 > 0 and Adv2oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qD) ≤ η2, for
any small η2 > 0. According to algorithm EXP2oracleA, SAS−Cloud(see Algorithm 2), if the attacker A earns success to execute the
inversion of cryptographic hash function H(·) as well as earns suc-
cess to crack DLP, then A can correctly obtain the secret key s
by employing random oraclesOracleH andOracleD, respectively
and secures the win in this game. However, according to Denition
1 and Denition 3, it can be written that AdvOracleHA (t) ≤ η1, for
any negligible η1 > 0 and AdvOracleDA (t) ≤ η2, for any negligible
η2 > 0. Since, we get Adv2oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH, qD)≤ η, for any
negligible η > 0 because, SAS-Cloud depends on AdvOracleHA (t)
as well as AdvOracleDA (t). Thus, the proposed SAS-Cloud is provid-
ing the security against the attacker A for obtaining s of the service
provider SP . 
Theorem 3. Under the assumption that the DLP and cryptographic
hash function H(·) represent the random oracles, SAS-Cloud is
provably secure against an attacker A for obtaining the common
secret session key SKi between Ui and SP even if A knows the
parameters that are reserved into Ui’s mobile device and captures
the communication messages between Ui and SP .
Proof: This work constructs an attacker A who has ability to
obtain the session key SKi between a user and the service
provider SP . However, we consider the same suppositions dis-
cussed in Theorem 1. The attacker A executes the experiment,
EXP3oracleA, SAS−Cloud for the secure authentication scheme (SAS-
Cloud) to obtain the session key SKi between Ui and SP as given
in Algorithm 3.
We dene the success probability of EXP3oracleA, SAS−Cloud
as Succ3oracleA, SAS−Cloud = |2Pr[EXP3oracleA, SAS−Cloud = 1]−
1|. Then the advantage of EXP3oracleA, SAS−Cloud is given by
Adv3oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH, qD) = maxA{Succ3oracleA, SAS−Cloud},
where we have taken the maximum over all A with the imple-
mentation time t, qH and qD are the # of queries asked to
OracleH and OracleD oracles, respectively. We can say SAS-
Cloud is provably secure against the attacker A for obtaining
the session key SKi between Ui and the service provider SP ,
if Adv3oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH) ≤ η1, for any negligible η1 > 0
and Adv3oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qD) ≤ η2, for any negligible η2 > 0.
EXP3oracleA, SAS−Cloud (discussed in Algorithm 3) shows, if the
attackerA is able to calculate reverse of the cryptographic hash func-
tion H(·) and also cracks DLP, then A can get success to derive the
session key SKi by employing theOracleH andOracleD random
oracles, and gets victory in the game. Nevertheless, after observing
Denition 1 and Denition 3, we can write AdvOracleHA (t) ≤ η1,
for any negligible η1 > 0 and AdvOracleDA (t)≤ η2, for any negligi-
ble η2 > 0. Since, we obtain Adv3oracleA, SAS−Cloud(t, qH, qD) ≤ η,
for any negligible η > 0 as, SAS-Cloud depends on AdvOracleHA (t)
as well as AdvOracleDA (t). Thus, the proposed SAS-Cloud is provid-
ing security against A for obtaining SKi between the user Ui and
the service provider SP . 
Theorem 4. A registered user UÂ as an attacker cannot extract the
private key s of the service provider SP even if he/she has stored
parameters into his/her mobile device.
Proof: A registered user say, Ui as an attacker Â may try to login
into SAS-Cloud as an another valid user say, Uj . To do so, Â must
knows the private key s of the service provider SP . Since, Â is a
legal user, Â knows his/her identity IDi, password PWi and bio-
metric parameter φi. Therefore, Â is able to calculateH(s‖IDi) by
executing Ci ⊕H(PWi‖φi), where Ci is the stored information
into his/her mobile device. However, from H(s‖IDi), Â unable
to derive s due to hardness of the reverse of cryptographic hash
function. In addition, Theorem 2 exhibits that s cannot be derived
from familiar parameters. As a result, Â cannot produce any security
attacks on SAS-Cloud.

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Algorithm 3 EXP3oracleA, SAS−Cloud
Input: Di, DIDi, Gi, Fi, Li, PK, g, q,Qi
Output: 0 or 1; 0: Fail, 1: Win
1: Asks OracleH on the input Di to obtain the information Ai (=H(s‖IDi)) as (A∗i )←OracleH(Di)
2: Asks OracleH on the input Fi to get the information Ai, ri and Ei as (r∗i ‖E∗i ‖A∗∗i )←OracleH(Fi)
3: Asks OracleD on the input PK (= gs mod q) to retrieve the information s as (s∗)←OracleD(PK)
4: Asks OracleH on the input Li to get the information SKi, IDi and Ai as (ID∗i ‖SK∗i ‖A∗∗∗i )←OracleH(Li)
5: Asks OracleD on the input Gi (= gri mod q) to retrieve the information ri as (r∗∗i )←OracleD(Gi)
6: if (A∗∗∗i == A
∗∗
i == A
∗
i ) && (r
∗
i == r
∗∗
i ) then
7: Computes E∗∗i = PK
r∗i mod q and y∗i = Qi ⊕A∗i
8: if (E∗i == E
∗∗
i ) then
9: Computes (ID∗∗i ‖r∗∗∗i ) = DIDi · (E∗i )−1 mod q
10: if (r∗∗∗i == r
∗
i ) && (ID∗∗i == ID∗i ) then
11: Executes SK∗∗i =H(y∗i ‖r∗i )
12: if (SK∗i == SK
∗∗
i ) then
13: SK∗i is accepted as the common session key
14: Return 1
15: else
16: Return 0
17: end if
18: else
19: Return 0
20: end if
21: else
22: Return 0
23: end if
24: else
25: Return 0
26: end if
6.1 Remarks on Proposed Theorems
Theorem 1 demonstrates that SAS-Cloud is providing security
against the off-line password guessing attack.
In SAS-Cloud,A cannot produce the forgery attack without know-
ing the PWi and biometric information Bi of a user Ui and the
private key s of the service provider SP . Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
show that the condential parameters of the service provider and the
user are well protected from the attacker. As a result, there is no
feasibility to produce the forgery attack on SAS-Cloud.
Furthermore, Theorem 3 shows that SAS-Cloud can protect the
session key obtaining attack because, without any knowledge of
random nonce(s) ri and yi, A cannot derive the session key SKi.
In SAS-Cloud, the communicating messages are computed using
random numbers. Hence, the messages are assuring to be non-
identical for each session. As a result, A cannot create the replay
attack on SAS-Cloud. In addition, Denial of Service (DoS) attack is
easily identied in SAS-Cloud (See Section 8).
7 Performance Evaluation
Here, the performances of SAS-Cloud are compared with the com-
peting existing authentication schemes namely, Tan’s scheme [13],
Yan et al.’s scheme [14], Mishra et al.’s scheme [15], Chuang and
Chen’s scheme [16], Hwang and Li’s scheme [23], Shen et al.’s
scheme [32], Yoon et al.’s scheme [34], Ramasamy and Muniyandi’s
scheme [36] and Lee et al.’s scheme [37]. The compared schemes
in [1316, 23, 32, 34, 36, 37] are not usable for practical scenar-
ios because, these schemes are not resisting the security attacks
(See Table 2). In the related work section of this work, we have
described that most of the proposed schemes are insecure against
security attacks. Furthermore, analysis of security of SAS-Cloud
(see Section 6) shows that it can protect all the possible attacks.
Therefore, SAS-Cloud is more secure than other schemes.
Table 3 is given to show the storage cost, computational cost
and communication overhead comparison of the schemes in [1316,
23, 32, 34, 36, 37] with the proposed SAS-Cloud. Here, only login
and authentication phases have been considered due to rapid and
maximum use during online cloud services. On the other hand, reg-
istration of users is done ofine and this phase is used only one time
in the authentication systems. Therefore, communication and com-
putational costs of registration phase can be neglected with respect to
login and authentication phases. TEXP , TH, TM, TENC and TDEC
are the times required for exponentiation operation, hash operation,
multiplication operation, symmetric key encryption and decryption
respectively. However, it is well known that exponentiation opera-
tion takes more time than other operations and order of execution
time can be expressed as: TEXP >> TH ≈ TENC / TDEC > TM
[17]. SAS-Cloud takes time for three exponentiation operation in
two phases, which is the lower among ElGamal-based schemes in
[23, 32, 34, 36, 37]. However, according to MIRACL C/C++ Library
with the specications of system (i.e., processor: Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-4210U CPU @ 1.70GHz 2.40 GHz; RAM: 8 GB; 64-bit Win-
dows 10; Visual C++ 2008 software), the time complexity of the
different cryptographic operations is roughly calculated as follows:
(1) TENC / TDEC : For private key en/decryption, the time com-
plexity is ≈ 0.1303 ms, (2) TH: For cryptographic hash function,
the time complexity is ≈ 0.0004 ms, (3) TEXP : Time complexity
for exponentiation is ≈ 1.8269 ms, and (4) TM: Time to execute
multiplication operation is≈ 0.0147 ms. According to the aforemen-
tioned information, a comparison graph (see Fig. 5) has been given
as an evidence to show that SAS-Cloud takes less time to execute
than related ElGamal cryptosystem based schemes. Here, we assume
that the length of IDi and PWi are 64 bits each. Cryptographic
hash function H(·), threshold value δd, symmetric key encryp-
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Table 2 Security attacks and functionality comparison of SAS-Cloud with related competing schemes
Tan Yan et Mishra et Chuang and Hwang and Shen et Yoon et Ramasamy and Lee et SAS-Cloud
[13] al. [14] al. [15] Chen [16] Li [23] al. [32] al. [34] Muniyandi [36] al. [37]
SA1 –
√ √ × √ √ √ √ √ ×
SA2 × × √ × √ √ √ √ × ×
SA3 – – × √ √ √ √ √ √ ×
SA4 –
√ × √ √ √ √ √ √ ×
SA5 – –
√ √ × × × × × ×
SA6
√
– × √ – – × – × ×
SLS × × √ √ × × √ × √ √
SPS × × √ √ × × √ × √ √
MA × × × × × × × × × √
UT
√ √ √ × √ √ √ √ √ ×
SA1: Password guessing attack, SA2: Attack by insider, SA3: Forge message attack, SA4: Attack after stealing smart card/mobile device, SA5: Replay
attack, SA6: DoS attack, SLS: Systematic login system, SPS: Systematic password change system, MA: Mutual authentication, UT: User traceability, ×:
no,
√
: yes, –: Not applicable
Table 3 Communication, storage and computation costs comparison of SAS-Cloud with competing existing schemes
Cost of Storage Cost of Communication
Cost of Computation
Schemes
(in bits) (in bits)
Login + Authentication Login Authentication
Tan [13] 384 576 4TH+1TENC 7TH+1TDEC
Yan et al. [14] 640 960 3TH 8TH
Mishra et al. [15] 800 1120 4TH 10TH+1TENC+1TDEC
Chuang and Chen [16] 576 960 4TH 12TH
Hwang and Li [23] 1152 2280 3TEXP+TH 3TEXP+TH
Shen et al. [32] 2176 2280 3TEXP+TH 3TEXP+TH
Yoon et al. [34] 4544 2496 TEXP+2TH+TM 3TEXP+4TH+4TM
Ramasamy and Muniyandi [36] 1152 3432 2TEXP+TH 3TEXP+TH
Lee et al. [37] 384 3456 3TEXP+TH+TM 4TEXP+8TH
SAS-Cloud 640 2432 2TEXP+5TH+TM TEXP+7TH+TM
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Fig. 5: Execution time in login and authentication phases of various
related schemes (ElGamal cryptosystem-based): a comparison with
SAS-Cloud
tion/decryption, random numbers, and timestamp return 128 bits
each. Exponentiation operation provides 1024 bits. The communi-
cation cost of the proposed SAS-Cloud for login message is (1024 +
1024 + 128) = 2176 bits and message cerated in authentication and
key agreement phase is (128 + 128) = 256 bits. Therefore, overall
communication cost is (2176 + 256) = 2432 bits, which is less than
related ElGamal-based schemes in [34, 36, 37]. The storage cost of
SAS-Cloud is (128 + 128 + 128 + 128) = 512 bits, which is also
less than related schemes in [1416, 23, 32, 34, 36].
After resisting all possible attacks (based on random oracle
model) as discussed in Section 6, SAS-Cloud has better trade-off
among communication, computational and storage costs compared
to the existing related schemes.
8 Satisfaction to Use of SAS-Cloud
1. Efcient login system: By some unwanted mistakes, if a user Ui
inputs a faulty password as well as faulty identity in login phase
of SAS-Cloud, the mobile device can identify the incorrect inputs
before going to create a login message. This is because, the mobile
calculatesB′i = B̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi) and veries des(B∗i ,B′i)≤ δd.
For the incorrectness, the mobile discards Ui; otherwise, it com-
putes θ′i = θ̂i ⊕H(IDi‖PWi), φ′i ← Rep(B∗i , θ′i), PWR′i =H(PWi‖φ′i), A′i = Ci ⊕ PWR′i, D′i = H(A′i) and compares D′i
=? Di. For the dissimilar result, the mobile discards Ui; otherwise,
considers PWi and IDi as correct inputs. Therefore, in SAS-Cloud
for the wrong inputs, no login message will be generated which
reduces extra communication overhead.
2. Efcient password update system: By some unwanted mistakes,
if a user Ui inputs a faulty password as well as faulty identity in
login phase of SAS-Cloud, the mobile device can identify the incor-
rect inputs before giving licence to the users to select their new
password. This is because, the mobile follows the same steps as
mentioned above to verify the correctness of entered inputs. Only
for the correct inputs, the mobile gives licence to Ui to select new
password. On the other hand, to update the password of a user, there
is no need any communication between the mobile device and the
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service provider. Hence, overhead for the communications is also
decrease in SAS-Cloud.
3. Identify of Denial of Service (DoS) attack: Before going to create
a login message, mobile device checks the password, biometric and
identity of a user Ui in SAS-Cloud. That means, for any wrong input
from user, mobile device does not generate login message. Now,
if a login request message of Ui is discarded by service provider
SP , then it can be said that the login message has been tampered
with another party (i.e., attacker) or corrupted by some reasons.
Therefore, the user may take necessary action to stop DoS attack
by informing service provider.
4. Satisfaction of mutual authentication: In SAS-Cloud, the service
provider SP calculates and agrees on a secret session key SKi after
checking the authenticity of the user Ui through login message and
after that, SP transmits a reply message to Ui. Similarly, Ui goes for
the same secret session key SKi with SP after checking the authen-
ticity of SP through reply message. Hence, two-way verication has
been done in SAS-Cloud. Beside this, SAS-Cloud can protect all the
possible security attacks (see, Section 6). Hence, SAS-Cloud satises
mutual authentication.
5. Untraceability of user: In SAS-Cloud, identity of a user Ui is
dynamic for every session. This is because, DIDi is computed as
(IDi‖ri) · Ei mod q, where Ei = PKri mod q and ri is a ran-
dom number, which will be non-identical for each session in random
fashion. Thus for different sessions, DIDi will be changed and as
security analysis of SAS-Cloud (see Theorem 1) shows that IDi can-
not be extracted from known parameter for an adversary. Therefore,
it can be claimed that the adversary cannot trace the user, which
means the adversary is unable to locate the valid user’s existence.
9 Conclusion
This work observed that most of the authentication protocols using
hash function and ElGamal cryptosystem for cloud based applica-
tions are affected by security attacks and are unable to hide the
actual identities of the end users during login session. Therefore, this
work has introduced a secure ElGamal-based authentication scheme
called SAS-Cloud. Analysis of security of SAS-Cloud using ran-
dom oracle model shows that it is secure from all possible attacks.
Performance comparison of SAS-Cloud with competing schemes
has shown that the proposed scheme is more efcient than these
competing schemes. In addition, as biometric features like nger
print, iris scan, retina scan, and hand geometry are used with pass-
word in SAS-Cloud, therefore they can improve the security label of
password-based authentication scheme. In future, this work will be
extended to provide secure authentication among cloud server and
Internet enabled devices so that a complete security framework can
be build for IoT applications.
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